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ABSTRACT 
OBJECTIVE: To assess the way healthcare facilities 
(HCFs) diagnose, survey, and control methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). 
DESIGN: Questionnaire. 
SETTING: Ninety HCFs in 30 countries. 
RESULTS: Evaluation of susceptibility testing methods 
showed that 8 laboratories (9%) used oxacillin disks with antimi-
crobial content different from the one recommended, 12 (13%) 
did not determine MRSA susceptibility to vancomycin, and 4 
(4.5%) reported instances of isolation of vancomycin-resistant S. 
aureus but neither confirmed this resistance nor alerted public 
health authorities. A MRSA control program was reported by 55 
(61.1%) of the HCFs. The following isolation precautions were 
routinely used: hospitalization in a private room (34.4%), wearing 
of gloves (62.2%), wearing of gowns (44.4%), hand washing by 
healthcare workers (53.3%), use of an isolation sign on the 
patient's door (43%), or all four. When the characteristics of HCFs 
with low incidence rates (< 0.4 per 1,000 patient-days) were com-
pared with those of HCFs with high incidence rates (s= 0.4 per 
1,000 patient-days), having a higher mean number of beds per 
infection control nurse was the only factor significantly associat-
ed with HCFs with high incidence rates (834 vs 318 beds; P = 
.02). 
CONCLUSION: Our results emphasize the urgent need 
to strengthen the microbiologic and epidemiologic capacities of 
HCFs worldwide to prevent MRSA transmission and to prepare 
them to address the possible emergence of vancomycin-resistant 
S. aureus (Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:334-341). 
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The emergence of resistance to antimicrobial agents 
has become a major public health problem worldwide in 
both community and healthcare settings.113 Emergence 
and spread of multidrug-resistant pathogens is facilitated 
when laboratory personnel have difficulty accurately 
detecting these organisms, the medical community does 
not identify and isolate patients colonized or infected with 
these organisms, and infection control interventions are 
either not implemented, ineffective, or implemented so 
late that the organisms have become endemic.7,9"11 The 
global spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) demonstrates these issues. MRSA emerged in 
Europe 40 years ago, concomitant with the introduction of 
methicillin. During the mid-1980s, epidemic strains spread 
in hospitals throughout the world and in most hospitals 
few, if any, infection control precautions were implement-
ed until these strains had become endemic.14"16 Currently, 
the large reservoir of patients colonized or infected with 
MRSA, many of whom are unrecognized, interferes with 
effective infection control.17 
Recently, infections caused by MRSA strains with 
reduced susceptibility to glycopeptides have been report-
ed from Japan, the United States, and France, signaling 
the potential emergence of S. aureus strains with full 
resistance to vancomycin.13,18'19 In addition, the recent 
emergence of community-acquired MRSA infections in 
Australia, Canada, France, and the United States will fur-
ther complicate efforts to control MRSA.20"23 The report of 
four pediatric deaths due to community-acquired MRSA 
demonstrates the potential severity of these infections.21 
Because of the continued emergence of multidrug-
resistant S. aureus, we considered it critical to assess the 
methods currently used by hospitals worldwide to control 
the emergence of MRSA The objectives of this survey 
were to assess (1) the methods used by laboratories to 
identify S. aureus and determine the susceptibility of this 
pathogen to antimicrobials, including methicillin; (2) the 
MRSA surveillance and control programs in these hospi-
tals; and (3) the incidence of MRSA infections in hospitals 
worldwide. 
METHODS 
The International Network for the Study and 
Prevention of Emerging Antimicrobial Resistance 
(INSPEAR) is a consortium of clinical microbiologists, 
hospital epidemiologists, infectious disease specialists, 
experts in the fields of antimicrobial resistance, public 
health agencies, and national reference laboratories 
whose purpose is to serve as an early warning system for 
emerging antimicrobial resistance. 
In May 1998, a questionnaire was sent to all 
INSPEAR centers to assess the way they currently identi-
fy, survey, and control MRSA. The form included ques-
tions about hospital characteristics, laboratory methods 
used to identify staphylococci and perform antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing, and the existence of MRSA surveil-
lance and control programs. Institutions were also asked 
to provide for each year, from 1990 to 1997, the total num-
ber of admissions, patient-days of hospitalization, S. 
aureus and MRSA isolates, and MRSA isolates from blood 
cultures. If these data were not available annually during 
this period, the centers were asked to provide data for 
1997 only. Laboratorians were asked to report only one 
isolate per patient and to exclude isolates obtained by col-
onization screening. 
Because the number of healthcare facilities by coun-
try varied from 1 to 21, it was impossible to stratify the 
results of the survey by country and the centers were 
grouped into 5 regions: Africa (N = 7), Eastern Europe (N 
= 27), Western Europe (N = 43), South America (N = 6), and 
the United States (N = 5). The Middle East and Asia with 
one center each were not included in the stratified analysis. 
Data were analyzed with Epi-Info software (version 6; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA). 
Risk factors for having a high rate of MRSA infec-
tions in 1997 were assessed by comparing the character-
istics (country, type of hospital [teaching, public, or 
private], number of beds, presence and type of MRSA sur-
veillance and control programs, and number of infection 
control nurses) of healthcare facilities with high incidence 
rates (those with MRSA infection rates per patient-days of 
0.4 or greater, which was the median infection rate in 
1997) with the characteristics of healthcare facilities with 
low incidence rates (MRSA infection rates per patient-
days of less than 0.4). 
Univariate analyses were performed using either 
the chi-square or Fisher's exact test for proportions and 
the Student's t test for means. 
RESULTS 
Of 110 INSPEAR healthcare facilities in 33 coun-
tries, 90 healthcare facilities (81.8%) from 30 countries 
participated in this survey. 
Hospital Characteristics 
Most of the 90 participating healthcare facilities 
were public hospitals (84.4%) or teaching hospitals 
(72.2%) with a median of 640 beds (range, 50 to 3,889) 
admitting a median of 19,790 patients (range, 342 to 
98,298) in 1997. Most of the healthcare facilities had adult 
intensive care units (84%) and medical services (93.5%) 
and surgical services (93.5%). Fewer than half of the 
healthcare facilities had either a neonatal intensive care 
unit (44.4%) or a pediatric intensive care unit (42%), or a 
long-term-care facility (36.7%). 
Methods Used to Identify Staphylococci 
Laboratory personnel used a combination of differ-
ent methods to identify S. aureus, including catalase 
(87.8%), tube coagulase (68.9%), in-house agglutination 
(25.6%), and commercial agglutination (68.9%). When need-
ed, they performed biochemical identification (74.4%). 
Methods Used for Susceptibility Testing 
For antimicrobial susceptibility testing, the disk-
diffusion method was most commonly used (79 of 90, 
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88%), followed by automated methods (26 of 90, 29%). 
Sixty-one (68%) of the laboratories used only the disk-dif-
fusion method, 8 (9%) used only an automated method, 
and 18 (20%) used both automated and disk-diffusion 
methods. 
Minimum inhibitory concentrations were deter-
mined by 38 (42.2%) of the laboratories for selected 
antimicrobials or in selected circumstances; the Etest 
(AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden) was the most common tech-
nique used (35 of 38, 92.1%). 
Automated methods were used mostly by Western 
European laboratories (17 of 26, 65.4%), whereas all labo-
ratories in Africa, Eastern Europe, and South America 
used only the disk-diffusion method. 
Four different interpretative breakpoints were used 
by the laboratories: the British Society for Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy breakpoints were used by 6 laboratories 
(6.7%); the Comite de l'Antibiogramme de la Societe 
Francaise de Microbiologic (France) breakpoints were 
used by 26 laboratories (28.9%); the Deutsches Institute fur 
Normung (Germany) breakpoints were used by 4 laborato-
ries (4.4%); and the National Committee for Clinical 
Laboratory Standards (United States) breakpoints were 
used by 55 laboratories (61.1%). Four laboratories (4.4%) 
used breakpoints from both the Comite de 
l'Antibiogramme de la Societe Francaise de Microbiologic 
and the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory 
Standards. To detect methicillin resistance among S. 
aureus, 48 (53%) of the laboratories used 1-ug oxacillin 
disks and 35 (38.9%) used 5-yg disks. A comparison 
between the type of oxacillin disk used and the recom-
mended breakpoints illustrates the problem caused by the 
multiplicity of interpretative breakpoints. The Comite de 
l'Antibiogramme de la Societe Francaise de Microbiologic 
recommends using 5-ug oxacillin disks; however, one cen-
ter supposedly following tiiese recommendations used a 1-
ug disk. On the other hand, although the National 
Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards recommends 
using a 1-ug oxacillin disk, 7 centers (12.7%) that reported 
using these recommendations used 5-ug disks. 
The reading of the disk-diffusion inhibition zone to 
assess whether a strain was resistant to oxacillin varied by 
laboratory. Sixty (66.7%) determined resistance by measur-
ing the inhibition zone diameter, 56 (62.2%) by looking for 
the presence of small colonies of staphylococci (squatter 
colonies) within the inhibition zone, and 40 (44.4%) by mea-
suring the inhibition zone and looking for squatter 
colonies. In addition, 30 (33.7%) of the laboratories used 
screening plates containing 6 ug/mL of oxacillin and NaCl 
to detect MRSA. This was performed in combination with 
the disk-diffusion method in 23 laboratories (25.6%), with 
the automated method in 1 laboratory, and with both disk 
and automated methods in 6 laboratories (6.7%). 
Laboratory Quality Assurance Programs for 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
Seventy-eight laboratorians (86.7%) reported the 
presence of a quality assurance program; 65 (72.2%) were 
internal programs and 48 (53.3%) were external. Only 38 
laboratorians (42.2%) participated in both programs. 
Antimicrobial Resistance 
Seventy-eight (87%) of the laboratorians tested 
MRSA susceptibility to vancomycin and 40 (44%) tested 
MRSA susceptibility to teicoplanin. Four of the laboratori-
ans reported rates of MRSA resistance to vancomycin of 
1.4%, 3.7%, 5.7%, and 25%, respectively, and one laboratori-
an reported a rate of resistance to teicoplanin of 6%. 
Unfortunately, these laboratorians did not save their iso-
lates, send them to reference laboratories for confirma-
tion, or alert public health authorities to the existence of 
their strains. Thus, we were unable to confirm the accu-
racy of these reports. 
Presence of Infection Control Nurses 
Fifty-one healthcare facilities (56.7%) reported the 
presence of at least one infection control nurse, with a 
median infection control nurse-to-bed ratio of 1 infection 
control nurse for 450 beds (range, 1:50 to 1:3,334). The 
highest infection control nurse-to-bed ratio was observed 
in South American healthcare facilities (median, 1:191; 
range, 1:80 to 1:324), followed by Western European 
healthcare facilities (median, 1:503; range, 1:130 to 
1:3,334) and Eastern European healthcare facilities (medi-
an, 1:615; range, 1:52 to 1:1,104). 
Surveillance Activities 
The existence of a MRSA surveillance program was 
reported by 59 (65.6%) of the healthcare facilities. The 
most common surveillance method used was the calcula-
tion of the proportion of all S. aureus isolates resistant to 
methicillin (45 of 90, 50%), followed by the calculation of 
MRSA incidence rate per admission (30 of 90, 33.3%) or 
per patient-days of hospitalization (20 of 90, 22.2%). Rates 
were calculated for the entire healthcare facility by 81.4% 
(48 of 59) of the healthcare facilities performing surveil-
lance and separately for each service by 52.5% (31 of 59). 
The surveillance rates were reported to clinicians on each 
service every month in 20.3% (12 of 59) of the healthcare 
facilities, every 3 months in 17% (10 of 59), every 6 
months in 39% (23 of 59), and yearly in 25.4%. Eighty-eight 
percent (52 of 59) of the centers used the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention definitions of nosocomial 
infections. The year of implementation of MRSA rate cal-
culations and the denominators used varied by healthcare 
facility (Figure). During the 1980s, few hospitals conduct-
ed surveillance for MRSA. Subsequently, the proportion 
of hospitals conducting MRSA surveillance steadily 
increased in the early 1990s, reaching 65% by 1997 
(Figure). 
In 1997, Western Europe (36 of 43, 83.7%) had the 
highest proportion of healthcare facilities reporting the 
existence of a MRSA surveillance program and calculat-
ing the proportion of S. aureus that were methicillin resis-
tant (25 of 43, 58%), the MRSA incidence per admission 
(24 of 43, 56%), and the MRSA incidence per patient-days 
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TABLE 1 
METHICILLIN-RESISTANT STAPHTLOCOCCUS AUREUS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS AND METHODS BY REGION, INSPEAR, 1997 
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FIGURE. Year of implementation of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) rate calculations and denominator used (percentage of 
healthcare facilities [HCFs]). SA = S. aureus. 
(15 of 43, 35%). In contrast, only 1 (16.7%) of 6 African 
healthcare facilities, 3 (11%) of 27 Eastern European 
healthcare facilities, 2 (33%) of 6 South American health-
care facilities, and none of the U.S. healthcare facilities 
calculated the incidence per admissions. Fewer health-
care facilities in each region calculated the incidence per 
patients-days, the highest proportion being observed 
among Western European healthcare facilities (15 of 43, 
35%) (Table 1). 
Surveillance Results 
A total of 12,828 MRSA strains (median, 102; range, 
1 to 1,196) were isolated at participating laboratories in 
1997. For this year, we were able to calculate the propor-
tion of S. aureus that were resistant to methicillin for 
64.4% of the healthcare facilities, the MRSA incidence rate 
per admission for 60%, the incidence of MRSA bacteremia 
per admission for 38.9%, and the MRSA incidence rate per 
patient-days for 34.4%. Of the 51 healthcare facilities pro-
viding data used to calculate the following rates, 46 
(90.2%) had a quality assurance program; 41 (80.4%) had 
an internal program and 24 (47%) participated in an exter-
nal program. The median proportion of S. aureus resistant 
to methicillin was 27.6% (range, 0% to 75%); the median 
incidence rate of MRSA infections was 0.49 per 100 admis-
sions (range, 0.02% to 8.8%) and 0.43 per 1,000 patient-
days of hospitalization (range, 0.04% to 3.7%). The median 
TABLE 2 
INCIDENCE OF METHICILLIN-RESISTANT STAPHTLOCOCCUS AUREUS 
INFECTIONS PER 1,000 PATIENT-DAYS OF HOSPITALIZATION 























incidence of bacteremia caused by MRSA was 0.073 per 
100 admissions (range, 0% to 16%). When we used the 
most appropriate indicator for inter-hospital MRSA rate 
comparison (ie, the incidence per patient-days of hospital-
ization), the median incidence rates were similar by 
region and by hospital size. However, the MRSA infection 
rates varied widely within each region or within each hos-
pital category (Table 2). 
MRSA Control Program 
In 1997, 61.1% (55 of 90) of the healthcare facilities 
reported the existence of a MRSA control program, rang-
ing from 81.5% (35 of 43) in Western Europe to 17% (1 of 
6) in Africa. 
The assessment of the type of isolation precautions 
implemented revealed that only 31 (34.4%) of the health-
care facilities systematically hospitalized MRSA-infected 
patients in a private room; workers in the healthcare facil-
ities wore gloves (56, 62.2%), gowns (40, 44.4%), or both 
during the care of MRSA-infected patients; hand washing 
was performed routinely in the patient's room in 48 
(53.3%) of the healthcare facilities; and an isolation sign 
was routinely posted on the patient's door in 39 (43%) of 
the healthcare facilities (Table 3). 
Wide variations in the use of isolation precautions 
were observed between regions. The proportion of hospi-
talized MRSA-infected patients placed in a private room 
ranged from 0% (0 of 6) in South America to 53.5% (23 of 
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TABLE 3 











Hand washing ir 
Routinely 
Occasionally 



















FOR PATIENTS INFECTED WITH METHICILLIN-RESISTANT STAPHTLOCOCCUS AUREUS, 
Africa 























INSPEAR = International Network for the Study and Prevention of Emerging Antimicrobial Resistance. 
Western Europe 



































43) in Western Europe. The routine use of gloves during 
the care of MRSA-infected patients ranged from 17% (1 of 
6) in Africa to 100% (5 of 5) in the United States. The rou-
tine use of gowns ranged from 0% (0 of 6) in Africa to 65% 
(28 of 43) in Western Europe. The proportion of health-
care facilities in which hand washing was routinely per-
formed in the patient's room ranged from 17% (1 of 6) in 
Africa to 62.8% (27 of 43) in Western Europe and 67% (4 of 
6) in South America. The proportion of healthcare facili-
ties posting an isolation sign on the patient's door ranged 
from 0% (0 of 6) in African healthcare facilities to 67% (4 of 
6) in South American healthcare facilities. Special proce-
dures, such as a letter informing that the transferred 
patient is colonized or infected, were used by 40 (44.4%) of 
the healthcare facilities, most in Western Europe (31 of 
43, 72%). Only 14 (15.6%) of the healthcare facilities were 
systematically cohorting patients infected or colonized 
with MRSA, whereas 17 (18.9%) did it occasionally (Table 
3). 
The implementation of a MRSA control program 
increased from 2.2% (2 of 90) of the healthcare facilities in 
1985 to 10% (9 of 90) in 1990, 37.8% (34 of 90) in 1995, and 
61.1% (55 of 90) in 1997. 
We classified a healthcare facility as "high inci-
dence" if its MRSA infection rate per patient-days was 0.4 
or greater, which was the median infection rate in 1997, 
and as "low incidence" if the rate was less than 0.4 per 
1,000 patient-days. On univariate analysis, the only risk fac-
tor for high incidence was the mean number of beds per 
infection control nurse. Healthcare facilities with high inci-
dence rates had a mean of 834 beds (standard deviation, 
805) per infection control nurse, whereas healthcare facili-
ties with low incidence rates had a mean of 318 beds (stan-
dard deviation, 209) per infection control nurse (P= .02). 
Program to Control the Use of Antimicrobials 
Overall, the use of antimicrobials was controlled at 
49 (54.4%) of the healthcare facilities: 3 (75%) of 4 in the 
United States, 25 (59.5%) of 42 in Western Europe, 13 
(52%) of 25 in Eastern Europe, 3 (50%) of 6 in South 
America, and 1 (17%) of 6 in Africa. Formulary restriction 
was the most common control method used (40 of 49, 
81.6%), followed by infectious disease or microbiology 
consultation (32 of 49, 65.3%) or stop orders (10 of 49, 
20.4%). 
Secular Trends in MRSA Infections 
Twenty-two healthcare facilities (Asia, N = 1; 
Western Europe, N = 15; Eastern Europe, N = 2; South 
America, N = 3; and United States, N = 1) provided data on 
the incidence per patient-days of hospitalization for 2 or 
more consecutive years, and 20 of them (91%) had a qual-
ity assurance program (internal, 18 [81.8%]; external, 14 
[63.6%]). From the date of initiation of the surveillance 
program to the end of 1997, the incidence of MRSA infec-
tion per patient-days decreased in 9 healthcare facilities 
(41%) and increased in 13 healthcare facilities (59%). 
During this time, changes in MRSA infection rates ranged 
from -54% to +414%. 
DISCUSSION 
The emergence of multidrug-resistant pathogens 
represents a major impending public health problem for 
healthcare facilities worldwide, but few data are available 
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about how healthcare facilities have prepared to face the 
challenge of controlling multidrug-resistant pathogens. In 
addition, the control of multidrug-resistant pathogens 
may be hampered in developed countries by the increas-
ing complexity of the healthcare delivery system and by 
attempts to reduce the costs of health care. In contrast, 
healthcare facilities in underdeveloped countries may lack 
basic microbiology and infection control resources. 
Therefore, we performed this survey to assess how 
healthcare facilities worldwide identify, survey, and con-
trol multidrug-resistant pathogens. 
MRSA was chosen as a target organism among the 
numerous multidrug-resistant pathogens because it is a 
true pathogen that has spread in healthcare facilities 
worldwide, it is becoming increasingly resistant to antimi-
crobials, including glycopeptides, and recent evidence 
suggests that MRSA also may be spreading within the 
community.1318"23 In addition, the subject is controversial 
and there is an ongoing polemic in the medical literature. 
Whereas some authors state that MRSA should be con-
trolled because these organisms may soon become resis-
tant to all antimicrobials and that infection control 
measures are beneficial, other authors suggest that the 
benefits of controlling MRSA are unclear because it is 
practically impossible to apply control measures and 
because attempts at controlling MRSA in healthcare facil-
ities have failed.2428 
We found several important deficiencies in the 
microbiology, epidemiology, and infection control areas. 
In microbiology, our survey revealed that some laborato-
ries have problems detecting or identifying resistance 
because of inadequate methods, as exemplified by the 
report of the isolation of vancomycin-resistant or 
teicoplanin-resistant S. aureus. Such clinical organisms 
had never been reported, yet no attempts were made to 
confirm the resistance or to alert public health authorities 
about their potential existence. This suggests that early 
warning systems may not exist in many countries and that 
laboratorians ignore or have no access to recommenda-
tions on how to detect emerging antimicrobial resistance 
and do not know to whom and when to send problematic 
isolates for confirmation or report the isolation of such 
organisms. In addition, potentially serious mistakes may 
be caused by the multiplicity of breakpoints when, as 
shown in this study, laboratories supposedly following 
one set of recommendations were using a disk designed 
for breakpoints recommended by another committee that 
contained an amount of antimicrobial different from the 
required amount. Such mistakes could be prevented if the 
national committees involved in antimicrobial susceptibil-
ity testing could reach a consensus on methods and 
breakpoints. Fortunately, several laboratories used a com-
bination of different methods to determine susceptibility 
to oxacillin, which could decrease the risk of errors. If we 
are to identify emerging multidrug-resistant pathogens, it 
will be necessary to educate laboratorians on appropriate 
laboratory methods to use. 
The fact that glycopeptide-intermediate S. aureus 
would not be detected by the laboratories using only the 
disk-diffusion method suggests that such strains could 
emerge in many areas of the world, remain undetected, 
and become endemic or transmitted to other patients and 
healthcare facilities both within and outside of a country. 
The assessment of the surveillance methods used 
by INSPEAR healthcare facilities showed that the imple-
mentation of MRSA surveillance programs was generally 
late during the MRSA epidemic, as few healthcare facili-
ties conducted such activities before 1990. The long delay 
in implementing surveillance programs while MRSA 
infection rates increased has led to the endemicity of 
patients infected or colonized with MRSA in many health-
care facilities worldwide. In addition, most healthcare 
facilities calculated only the proportion of all S. aureus 
that were methicillin resistant, a method that may poorly 
reflect the impact of infection control efforts.29 Fewer 
healthcare facilities used other denominators, such as the 
number of admissions, which is better for rate calculation, 
or the number of days of hospitalization, which is particu-
larly useful for inter-healthcare facility or intra-healthcare 
facility comparison. These data show that MRSA contin-
ues to increase in incidence in many healthcare facilities 
worldwide and will be difficult to control without sus-
tained infection control efforts. Furthermore, unless the 
types of rates or incidence data collected are changed, the 
measurement of secular trends or inter-hospital or intra-
hospital MRSA comparisons to evaluate the efficacy of 
control measures will be impossible. 
MRSA infection rates for 1997 showed wide varia-
tions. Of interest, the same variations were observed with-
in each category of healthcare facility when they were 
classified according to their number of beds or within 
each continent, even when the median rates of infection 
were similar. Therefore, the MRSA infection rates appear 
to be independent of the number of beds present in the 
healthcare facility or of the level of development of the 
country but dependent on the presence of an adequate 
number of trained infection control nurses, as shown in 
the analysis of risk factors for a high incidence rate of 
MRSA infection. This analysis showed that the infection 
control nurse in a healthcare facility with a low incidence 
rate was responsible for half the number of beds com-
pared with the infection control nurse in a healthcare facil-
ity with a high incidence rate. Thus, additional infection 
control nurses and infection control support will be need-
ed if we are to control MRSA and other multidrug-resis-
tant pathogens. 
The assessment of secular trends in MRSA infec-
tion clearly demonstrates that MRSA infections are far 
from being controlled in INSPEAR healthcare facilities. 
The incidence of MRSA infection increased in 59% of the 
healthcare facilities from the date of initiation of the sur-
veillance program to the end of 1997. 
The presence of a limited number of infection con-
trol nurses in many healthcare facilities and the evalua-
tion of the infection control precautions used by INSPEAR 
healthcare facilities may explain why MRSA infections are 
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so difficult to control. The assessment of the use of isola-
tion precautions recommended by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention or considered as accept-
ed practices revealed the existence of wide variations in 
the implementation of those precautions, even in devel-
oped countries.30 This was an assessment of policy. 
However, observational studies of infection control pre-
cautions nearly always reveal that practice is much lower 
than policy. The implementation of isolation precautions 
requires both the knowledge of the measures to use and 
the allocation of adequate resources; the poor compliance 
reported probably results from a combination of inade-
quate knowledge and resources. The poor familiarity with 
the recommended isolation precautions is demonstrated 
by the low rate of use of such inexpensive measures as 
posting an isolation sign on the patient's door. In contrast, 
the poor compliance with hospitalization in a private 
room, the use of gloves or gowns, and appropriate hand 
hygiene in the patient's room may be caused by inade-
quate education about recommended precautions but 
more likely reflects a lack of isolation facilities or infection 
control resources, even in developed countries. 
Our study has several limitations. The survey was 
not performed in a representative sample of hospitals, the 
quality of the data collected could not always be assessed, 
and variations in culturing practices could have an impact 
on the data. However, our results strongly suggest that 
the 90 INSPEAR healthcare facilities located in 30 coun-
tries with different levels of resources are not optimally 
prepared to control MRSA and other multidrug-resistant 
pathogens. Thus, the emergence of vancomycin-resistant 
S. aureus or any other pathogen resistant to all antimicro-
bials could lead to a public health disaster. The most effec-
tive way to control and prevent the emergence of MRSA 
or other multidrug-resistant pathogens is to make clinical 
microbiology laboratories and the medical community 
aware of and prepared for potential problems. 
Preparedness implies that laboratories have the capacity 
to detect emerging resistance, difficult resistance pheno-
types, or both; screen patients for colonization; share 
antimicrobial resistance data with infection control per-
sonnel and clinicians in a timely fashion; assess risk fac-
tors for emergence of resistance; monitor MRSA and mul-
tidrug-resistant pathogens with surveillance programs 
whose results are usable for control and prevention; and 
implement efficient isolation precautions (eg, private 
rooms with hand washing facilities and the allocation of 
gloves). 
Allowing MRSA to become endemic at many health-
care facilities worldwide raises an important infection con-
trol challenge. Do we attempt to control MRSA now 
before vancomycin resistance becomes prevalent or do 
we wait until MRSA has become vancomycin resistant and 
we have to deal with a worldwide catastrophe? Data show 
that aggressive screening and isolation of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci or MRSA can control or eliminate 
such multidrug-resistant pathogens.24,25 Although these 
measures are cost-effective, they are expensive and have 
been difficult to fund because their implementation 
requires the training of microbiology and infection control 
personnel and the strengthening of microbiology, epi-
demiology, and infection control capacities of healthcare 
facilities worldwide. Funding of these activities should 
become a priority at the local, national, and international 
levels before multidrug-resistant pathogens that are virtu-
ally untreatable emerge, are transmitted nationally and 
internationally, become endemic in our healthcare facili-
ties, and are transmitted to the community. 
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